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Abstract
Among non-specialists, the estimates of the HIV/AIDS transmission rate
are generally upwardly biased. This overestimation may be perceived as
a godsend, as it increases the incentives to have protected sexual relation-
ships. However, a pernicious eﬀect may counterbalance this positive eﬀect.
Combined with the overestimation of the transmission rate, an occasional un-
protected sexual encounter may induce the feeling that “the die is cast”, and
hence lead to a permanent neglect of condom use. In this paper, I construct
a model that reﬂects such insidious and unexpected behavior. I calculate
that the optimal transmission rate to be disclosed for safer sexual practices
ranges between 5% and 24.9%.




When non-specialists are asked about the probability of getting infected
with HIV during an unprotected sexual relationship with an infected indi-
vidual, their answer is always sharply upward biased. In fact, HIV/AIDS is
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November 25, 2010perceived as a very proliﬁc disease whose transmission is easy, if not mechan-
ical. Such a conception is probably due to both the high number of infected
individuals and the large media coverage of AIDS prevention campaigns.
However, the transmission rate for normal heterosexual intercourse is al-
ways lower than 1% (Wawer et al., 2005; Boily et al., 2009). Intuitively,
one may think that the overestimation of the transmission rate of HIV is
favorable: higher risk estimation induces a more cautious behavior and con-
sequently lowers the incidence of the disease. This is probably why prevention
campaigns neglect to inform people about true infection rates.
However, a more subtle and pernicious factor may counterbalance the
positive eﬀect of overestimating the transmission rate. When deciding to
have a sexual encounter, a couple decides to use or neglect protection, know-
ing that condoms are eﬀective for preventing between 80 and 95 percent of
all HIV transmissions through sexual intercourse (Pinkerton and Abramson,
1997; Weller and Davis, 2001; Hearst and Chen, 2004). However, although
people are generally likely to use condoms during casual and commercial
sexual encounters, they are rarely used in longer-term relationships in which
there is a sense of commitment and trust (Meekers and Klein, 2002; Meekers
et al., 2003; Flood, 2003). In fact, condom use is strongly associated with the
notions of unfaithfulness, distrust, lack of love, and decrease of penile sensa-
tion (Leclerc-Madlala, 2002; Flood, 2003).In a qualitative study in Australia
carried among young heterosexual men, Flood (2003) found that condom
use mainly serves as a contraceptive method rather than as a prophylaxis.
His study also emphasized that condoms interrupt the “heat of the moment”.
Hence, couples often engage in unsafe practices, either because of conﬁdence
in the partner, for practical reasons or because of the impulsive character of
sex (risky sex may also be due to involuntary condom failure).
If unsafe practices were occasional and exceptional, the disease would die
out in a few years, considering its low transmission rate. However, couples
who engage in risky sex once will generally repeat this practice over time
(Flood, 2003; Meekers et al., 2003). This may be partly due to addiction to an
already overridden rule. Another explanation, not covered in the HIV/AIDS
literature, is the wrong estimation of the transmission rate. Let us imagine
a young, irresponsible adolescent male engaging in unsafe sex because of
instantaneous passion, and let us assume he trusts the contraceptive methods
2and the ﬁdelity of his partner. If his estimation of the transmission rate is
high, for instance 80%, he may not want to protect himself anymore with this
partner after their ﬁrst unprotected encounter. In fact, he may think “if the
girl was HIV positive, I surely got infected and hence, we don’t have to care
anymore about protection ”. Conversely, if his estimation is low, he should be
more willing to protect himself in further sexual intercourses. Besides, if he
thinks the probability of being infected is perceived as zero, he will probably
continue to engage in unsafe practices.
Hence, before the ﬁrst unprotected intercourse, I expect a positive correla-
tion between the expected transmission rate and the use of condom. However,
after a ﬁrst neglect in protection, the rate of protected sex follows a non-linear
function of the expected transmission rate. The aim of this paper is therefore
to construct an empirically testable model of this U-shaped relation between
the expected transmission rate and condom use. The simulations of the
model answer three main questions: “Should prevention campaigns disclose
the true transmission rate of the HIV/AIDS virus?”, “What would be the
optimal transmission rate to disclose?” and “What would happen if a big
hearsay or an Internet buzz propagates the rumor that the transmission rate
is very low?”.
1.2. Literature review
The perception of the risk has barely been taken into account in empir-
ical research on condom use. To the best of my knowledge, no theoretical
and only a few empirical papers have included people’s assessments of HIV
transmission rate. To this regard, three studies are important to notice.
First, Meekers and Klein (2002) found a positive correlation between risk
perception and condom use for males with casual partners, but no signiﬁ-
cant correlation for men with regular partners 2. For both men with regular
and casual partners, later levels of condom use were signiﬁcantly lower than
earlier levels. This evidence backs my model: a high expected transmission
rate implies low risk for ﬁrst encounters (and hence for a casual encounter),
but causes higher risk after a couple has failed to protect itself once.
Second, Maharaj and Cleland (2005), building on data from South African
2This analysis was not done for women because too few females in their sample reported
having a casual partner in the year before the survey
3couples, noticed that wives who perceived a risk of HIV infection from their
partner were more or less four times more likely to report consistent or occa-
sional condom use. Unfortunately, the authors have not reported the same
statistics for husband, nor did they try to distinguish consistent and occa-
sional condom use.
Third, Lammers et al. (2009) used data collected in several markets in
Lagos (Nigeria) to show that the perceived level of risk is positively correlated
with safer behavior for men only. Risk perception was measured on a 7-step
scale ranging from “not at all risky” to “extremely risky”. In this context,
males who perceived unprotected sex as extremely risky appeared to be 50%
more likely to have used a condom during the last intercourse than those
who perceived it as not risky at all. Regarding women, there was a signiﬁ-
cant correlation between risk perception and condom use for single, but not
for married women. The fact that culturally, a married woman cannot stop
intentionally having children, together with their lack of bargaining power,
could explain the irrelevance of the result for married women. The authors
indeed showed that single women who know that condoms are eﬀective in
preventing HIV transmission used them signiﬁcantly more often during the
last intercourse than their married counterparts. This diﬀerence was also sig-
niﬁcant regarding males, which conﬁrms both the importance diﬀerentiating
between casual and regular relationships, and the crucial dimension of time
in studying the eﬀects of perceived risk. Unfortunately, their questionnaire
did not ask with whom respondents had their last sexual intercourse, nor did
the measure of perceived risk distinguished between prevalence and expected
transmission rate. Moreover, risk perception enters only linearly in their
probit model, without taking into account a possible quadratic relationship
between perceived risk and condom use.
These three empirical studies provide crucial insights but lack an inte-
grated theoretical background that would both explain the pernicious side
eﬀects of a misevaluated infection rate of the HIV virus, and evaluate the
consequences of educational programs aiming to teach the true scale of the
transmission rate. Despite the crucial importance of safe-sex practices, the
complex links between AIDS education and the decision to use condoms dur-
ing sexual encounters have rarely been examined through economic model.
In this context, general approaches stand out and are worth exploring before
presenting a new model. First, Philipson and Posner (1994) have confronted
4the private demand for information with the public provision of AIDS edu-
cation. They noticed that the eﬀect of public prevention is likely to be small.
Indeed, in high-prevalence sub-populations, private incentives to get infor-
mation are important enough to avoid public funding on AIDS information.
Conversely, when the prevalence inside a sub-population is low, public provi-
sion of information tends to be useless since the risk is too low to deter unsafe
practices. Assuming that accurate information enables people to diﬀerentiate
between safe and risky behavior, Philipson and Posner (1994) subsequently
discussed the hypothesis that providing truthful information may encourage
dangerous behavior because people often exaggerate the infectivity of the
AIDS virus. However, their model does not include the potential harmful
repercussions of learning the true value of parameters such as the expected
transmission rate or the prevalence of HIV/AIDS.
Second, much of the theoretical literature on HIV/AIDS is based on the SI
(susceptible-infected) epidemiological model (Rottingen and Garnett, 2002;
Viladent and van Ackere, 2007). In this type of model, healthy individu-
als (the susceptibles) match with infected people and become infected with
a certain probability. Few diﬀerential equations determine how the popu-
lations of susceptible and infected people evolve across time. For instance,
it allows the impact of diﬀerent prevention strategies or diﬀerent network
organisations on the propagation of the virus to be evaluated. The propaga-
tion of the virus in the population of susceptibles is mainly measured by the
basic reproductive rate R0 which is above 1 if the disease will spread in the
population (epidemic) and below 1 if the disease is expected to disappear. A
recurring quest in this literature is the best speciﬁcation for the transmission
process of the virus (Rottingen and Garnett, 2002). Is the transmission rate
of the virus a constant for each partner? Or for each encounter? Does the
transmission process follow a more complex speciﬁcation with heterogene-
ity of infectiousness across individuals or across the diﬀerent stages of the
disease? Although Kaplan (1990) and Rottingen and Garnett (2002) have
shown that a constant transmission rate for each encounter is not empirically
consistent, I assume people do not have a perfect knowledge of the diﬀerent
HIV/AIDS stages and they act having in mind a constant per-act probability
of transmission denoted . With that simple speciﬁcation, the probability
of being infected after n sexual encounters is given by the binomial model:
p[1   (1   )n] where p is the probability that the partner is infected. I will
apply that speciﬁcation in my model.
5The SI model generally considers individual behavior as exogenous. How-
ever, some researchers such as Kremer (1994, 1996) and more recently Me-
choulan (2004) introduced behavioral choices into the SI model. Kremer
(1994, 1996) showed that prevention strategies that tend to decrease the num-
ber of partners may increase long-run prevalence. These two theoretical mod-
els conclude than condom promotion is more eﬃcient than strategies based
on the reduction of partners. In their framework, learning the true value
of the parameters is not considered as an alternative prevention method.
Mechoulan (2004) studied the impact of HIV/AIDS testing on sexual be-
havior theoretically. Even if selﬁsh individuals may increase their number
of partners after learning they are infected, Mechoulan (2004) showed that
minimal altruism is suﬃcient for testing to become beneﬁcial. Empirically,
public health literature indicates that people are altruist enough when good
counselling is provided after a positive test. This model focuses mainly on
the behavior of HIV positive people. Again, the infection rate is considered
to be known by individuals.
More recently, Tremblay and Ling (2005) set up a model of people’s de-
cisions to engage in sexual encounters and to protect themselves, in the light
of their perceptions of the probability of HIV transmission. In their model
education may favor best practice by promoting safer intercourse methods,
by encouraging correct condom use (risk-altering strategy) or by increasing
the perceived probability of infection. However, AIDS education may also
encourage risky behavior if it conveys social approval of sexuality or if it
provides information diminishing the perceived probability of infection. Em-
pirically, Tremblay and Ling (2005) showed that AIDS education does not
signiﬁcantly discourage abstinence but does signiﬁcantly encourage condom
use. The concern about the possible dangerous consequences of social ap-
proval of intercourse does not seem consistent with US data. Regrettably,
Tremblay and Ling (2005) did not take into account the fact that people
misjudge the risk of infection. Neither does their model neither predict the
potential negative consequences of an overestimated transmission rate.
Empirically, numerous evaluations of the long-term impact of condom
promotion programs yielded mixed results (Meekers et al., 2003; Hearst and
Chen, 2004; Wong et al., 2005). However, when information is well provided,
prevention may induce people to conduct safer sexual encounters, i.e. to use
condoms, to avoid intergenerational sex, and to avoid multiple concomitant
6partners (Tremblay and Ling, 2005; Duﬂo et al., 2006; Dupas, 2009; Thorn-
ton, 2008).
As part of this review of the existing literature, I considered a few em-
pirical papers that included risk perception in their analysis of condom use.
Unfortunately, these papers were never based on a strong theoretical ba-
sis. Also, the existing theoretical literature about AIDS education does not
include the possible pernicious eﬀect of biased knowledge about speciﬁc pa-
rameters. The overestimation of the riskiness of unprotected sexual behavior
is always seen as favorable and exceptional non-use of condoms is never dis-
sociated from permanently risky behavior.
1.3. My contribution
In this paper, I will study both theoretically and empirically, the links
between regular/casual condom use and the per-act expected transmission
rate. I propose a behavioral model incorporating risk evaluation. I include
the time dimension of the condom-use decision and distinguish the misevalu-
ation of the prevalence and the overestimation of the expected transmission
rate. The aim is to show that biased knowledge of the expected transmis-
sion rate may have a positive and a pernicious eﬀect, yielding a U-shaped
relationship between the risk and the expected transmission rate. By cali-
brating the model with existing data, I ﬁnd it optimal to disclose that the
transmission rate is between 5% and 24.9%.
In the second section, I present some stylised facts drawn from ﬁeld data
collected among students in Burundi. I show that their basic knowledge
about the virus is good for broad questions such as the Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS), but sharply biased when a precise evaluation of some
parameters is requested. In the third section, I develop a simple model of a
risk-neutral agent who has to choose between safe and risky sex. I show that
an upward-biased evaluation of the infection rate may be harmful when an
unplanned risky sexual intercourse is quite probable. In the fourth part, I
propose several numerical estimations of the model. Those diﬀerent calibra-
tions allow me to calculate the optimal disclosed transmission rate, i.e. the
transmission rate that minimizes the risk taken by individuals. In the two
last section of this paper, I discuss the validity of the conclusions and I give
suggestions for further research to evaluate the impact of educational pro-
grams that provide correct information on the infection rate of HIV/AIDS.
72. Stylized facts
The few empirical studies linking risk evaluation and condom use suggest
that the beliefs of people about the riskiness of unprotected sex are strongly
biased. Using data from Nigerian markets in 2008, Lammers et al. (2009)
found that 49.8% of interviewees evaluated unprotected sex as extremely
risky. Only 7.5% of the unmarried indicated that unprotected sex is not risky
at all. Men’s and women’s answers were not statistically diﬀerent. Lammers
et al. (2009) did not identify whether unprotected sex was seen as risky
because of high perceived prevalence, because of high perceived infectivity, or
both. Their questionnaire distinguished diﬀerent degrees of risk but did not
ask for a numerical equivalent (i.e. an explicit evaluation of the parameters).
Similarly, Meekers and Klein (2002) found that in South African couples,
22% of husbands and 57% of wives perceived a risk of HIV infection from
their partner.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no available data on people’s numer-
ical evaluations of very speciﬁc parameters such as the expected transmission
rate of the HIV/AIDS virus, the expected prevalence or the expected length
of life while infected. However, these parameters are the ones rational individ-
uals use in deciding whether to protect themselves or not. Hence, I conducted
a ﬁeld survey in Burundi in May 2010 in order to assess the knowledge of
individuals about HIV/AIDS and the impact on their behavior.
Some 509 volunteers from diﬀerent courses at the University of Burundi
in Bujumbura were interviewed in May 2010. In order to attract students,
a team of workers distributed some ﬂyers at the two main entrances of the
University advising that volunteers could take part to a survey and earn 1,000
FBU in 10 minutes. Of course, this sampling method is not random at all and
the sample will not reﬂect the behavior of the whole Burundian population.
However, because classes are compulsory at the University of Burundi, the
sample is fairly representative of the student population because the reward
oﬀered for participation was suﬃciently high. With too low a reward, only
poor people and individuals who care about HIV/AIDS would have answered
the questionnaire. Their expectations and behavior might be very diﬀerent
from the rest of the students. In order to minimize this risk of possible bias,
I gave a reward which was large enough to attract every student.
The expression of probabilities and the evaluation of numbers require very
8speciﬁc skills which are generally not mastered by the general population.
The sample was hence limited to highly educated people. Of course, when
taking a risky decision related to sex, everybody - educated and less educated
- tries to assess the dangerousness of their behavior. However, expressing the
complexity of the calculation may be very diﬃcult. In order to minimize
the bias due to the fact that less educated people have diﬃculty evaluating
probabilities, I decided to focus on educated people, at the expense of a
less representative sample. The goal was ﬁrst to show that even educated
people who have followed speciﬁc prevention programs have a really biased
knowledge of transmission probabilities. Second, I wanted to draw up a list of
diﬀerent sexuality proﬁles and to compare them with the level of knowledge
of the virus. These proﬁles will permit us to calibrate the simulations in order
predict an optimal expected transmission rate level that would minimize the
risk of transmission of the virus.
I used self-completion questionnaires for three reasons. First, not hiring
interviewers was less time consuming and less expensive. Second, in order to
assess the validity of the model, I did not need a complete measurement of
all aspects of each individual in the sample. I only needed to evaluate their
beliefs about HIV/AIDS and to collect data about their past sexual behav-
ior. Because this information is very private and sensitive, I hoped to achieve
more reliable information if respondents answered by themselves in an anony-
mous way. No name was requested on the questionnaire and the students
deposited their completed questionnaire in a closed ballot box. Finally, be-
cause all the respondents were highly educated, they easily understood how
to ﬁll in the questionnaire.
The main descriptive statistics are presented by gender in table 1. The
sample was 66% male. The average age was 25.2 years. The questionnaire
was divided into 3 parts: a probability test, an HIV/AIDS knowledge test,
and a part on past sexual behavior. First, I evaluated the ability of intervie-
wees to assess probabilities in simple games (coins and dice). The results of
this probability test were disappointing: only 5 students answered correctly
to all 4 questions (less than 1% of the sample) and 27 answered correctly to
3 out of the four questions (about 5.3%). 388 respondents (about 76% of the
students) gave no correct answers.
Second, I assessed the beliefs of students about the HIV/AIDS virus. The
answers on HIV/AIDS conﬁrmed my intuition: basics about the HIV/AIDS
9Table 1: HIV beliefs and behavior
Variable Obs. Total Male Female p-value
(H0: M=F)
Age 508 25.2 25.5 24.7 0.001
Sex 506 66.8% 337 168
Prob. (2 heads) 402 16.2% 18.0% 12.0% 0.111
Prob. (tails then heads) 403 16.4% 15.4% 19.1% 0.380
Prob. (dice: double 6) 390 14.6% 14.5% 15.0% 0.901
Prob. (dice: sum=3) 375 7.5% 7.6% 7.3% 0.911
HIV+ may look healthy 504 98.4% 99.1% 97.0% 0.141
Avoid sex diminish P(infected) 492 88.0% 91.1% 82.3% 0.010
Condom diminish P(infected) 460 90.4% 93.2% 84.5% 0.009
Expected transmission rate (B) 478 81.4% 81.6% 81.1% 0.820
Exp. trans. rate with condom (B) 474 17.2% 16.3% 19.0% 0.241
Had an HIV/AIDS test 506 65.0% 62.5% 69.5% 0.118
Prevalence in Burundi 440 27.9% 20.8% 42.1% 0.000
Life expectancy while infected 419 8.0 7.8 8.3 0.562
Heard about ARV therapies 504 94.0% 95.2% 92.2% 0.211
Participated in a prevention training 508 87.8% 86.9% 89.3% 0.438
Belong to an association 491 34.0% 33.4% 34.0% 0.907
Already had sexual relationship 505 48.3% 50.1% 43.7% 0.174
Age at the ﬁrst encounter 241 18.1 17.2 20.1 0.000
Always uses a condom 240 43.33% 48.48% 30.56% 0.008
Condom at the ﬁrst encounter 242 48.35% 50.30% 43.06% 0.305
Condom at the last encounter 239 46.44% 50.00% 38.57% 0.107
Guilt if no condom use 212 78.77% 81.38% 71.88% 0.148
Experienced a condom failure 211 24.64% 26.17% 22.03% 0.527
Know a place to buy condoms 455 85.71% 91.30% 74.51% 0.000
Feel guilty if ask for condom use 362 44.20% 47.22% 37.04% 0.072
virus are well-known, but speciﬁc information about the transmission are
sharply biased. Indeed, 98.4% of the respondents knew that infected peo-
ple look healthy, 88% that it is possible to reduce the risk of infection by
avoiding any sexual relationships, and 90.4% that the probability of trans-
mission of the HIV/AIDS virus could be reduced by using condoms during
sexual encounters. These promising statistics are probably due to the fact
that 87.8% of the respondents had had some prevention training. However,
speciﬁc parameters about the transmission of the virus remained largely un-
known. Although the transmission rate of the HIV/AIDS virus during any
unprotected sexual encounter with an infected partner is almost always lower
than 1% (Boily et al., 2009; Wawer et al., 2005), the average transmission
rate estimated by the respondents was about 81% (Figure B.1). Similarly,
the students estimated the average risk of transmission with condoms at
17.2%, which is much higher than the true transmission rate for unprotected
10encounters (Figure B.2). The prevalence of HIV-positive people in Burundi
was largely unknown to the students. On average, they estimated that 27.9%
of the population was infected by the virus, with a very large standard de-
viation of 21.4 (Figure B.3). In 2007, the UNAIDS and the WHO estimated
that 2% of the adult population in Burundi was infected. The overestimation
of the risk of transmission is a strong argument in favor of a theoretical study
about the indirect consequences of such a dramatization of HIV/AIDS infec-
tivity. It is worth noting that the students’ estimates of the life expectancy
of HIV-positive people with and without ARV therapies were quite accurate
(Figures B.4 and B.5).
Finally, I asked about past sexual behavior in order to build diﬀerent
sexuality proﬁles. Surprisingly, 51.7% of the interviewees claimed they had
never had any sexual relationships. The average age for the ﬁrst sexual
encounter of the others was 17.2 years for men and 20.1 years for women.
Sadly, 28.6 % of the ﬁrst sexual relationships were by children less than 16
years old, and 13.2% below 12 years old. Half of the sexually active males
and 38.57% of females aﬃrmed that they used a condom during their last
intercourse. Under 14 years old, none of them used condoms, either because
of the violent nature of the encounter (rape) or because they were too young
to be aware of the riskiness of the behavior. 73.33% of the respondents
declared that condom use brings less pleasure than risky sex (Figure B.6).
Some 37.4% of students who were sexually active never used a condom with
their last partner, 22% used often condoms, 11.5% had used condoms at some
point in the past, and 29% of respondents always used a condom with their
last partner.
3. A theoretical model
3.1. Set-up
My aim was to construct a simple n-period model in discrete time that
links condom use and the evaluation of speciﬁc parameters such as the ex-
pected transmission rate and the prevalence. In the simplest framework,
a healthy and risk-neutral individual i begin his or her sexual life at time
t = 0. He or she has n repeated sexual encounters with a partner j (one
relation per period). Let us assume that the serostatus of j, denoted pj, is
ﬁxed and unknown. Each period, the individual i chooses whether or not
to use a condom. If protection is used at time t, sit = 0, and the sexual
11relationship is assumed to be risk free. Otherwise, sit = 1 and there is a
constant positive probability  that the virus is transmitted if the partner is
infected. In reality, the transmission rate  is not constant: the infectivity
is higher in the ﬁrst and the later stages of the disease (Wawer et al., 2005;
Boily et al., 2009). However, I assume a constant expected transmission rate
E() because individuals are not well informed about the diﬀerent stages of
the AIDS disease and because it is very diﬃcult to visually distinguish HIV
positive people from uninfected individuals. While infected, an individual
has a probability 1
 > 1 of dying in each period of time where  is the life
expectancy of a sick person.





tui(sit)(1   E(dit)) (1)
where E(dit) is the expected probability of dying from AIDS, sit is equal to
1 for risky sex and 0 if a condom is used, and  is the discount rate. We
assume a separable linear utility function:
ui(sit) =  + sit + (1   sit) (2)
with 0 <  < 1 because protected sex is less highly valued than risky sex (as
mentioned above and observed during the survey).  represents all the other
pleasures that an individual enjoys and is assumed to be constant over time.
If  is high, people are less willing to exchange years of life against risky sex.
If  is low, people prefer more the pleasure of risky practices even if it may
shorten their life. In the simulations, I show that the results are insensitive
to changes in , meaning that the conclusions remain valid if the assumption
of risk neutrality with respect to length of life is relaxed.
I assume that AIDS is the only cause of death. Therefore, the expected
probability of dying depends only on self-protection choices during preceding
sexual encounters. At time t, the individual i may be in four diﬀerent states.
He or she may be uninfected with an uninfected partner (pit = 0 and pj = 0),
uninfected with an infected partner (pit = 0 and pj = 1), infected and alive
(dit = 0 and pit = 1) or infected and dead (dit = 1 and pit = 1). I assume
that people take rational decisions based on a binomial epidemiological model
with a constant probability of transmission per coïtal act. As explained in the
12introduction, more complex epidemiological models are available (Rottingen
and Garnett, 2002), but they seem to be less consistent with people’s biased
beliefs. If E(pjt) is the unknown expected status of partner j, E() the
expected transmission rate, and E() the expected life expectancy of an
HIV-positive individual, the subjective probabilities of being in one of these
states at time t are:










j infected - no transmission
; (4)







B B B B
@
[1   (1   E())
sk]
| {z }














no infection before k
1
C C C C
A
;







B B B B
@
[1   (1   E())
sk]
| {z }
transmission occurs at k













no infection before k
1
C C C C
A
:
3.2. Solution of the inﬁnite period model
In this section, I will solve the model for an agent i with an inﬁnite
horizon. In order to clarify the formulas, I forget the expectations in the
equations. However, I keep in mind that all variables are subjective for the
individual i. By assuming a possible inﬁnite life, an “end of life” eﬀect in
13which the individual chooses risky behavior because he or she knows that
the optimization problem will ﬁnish soon is avoided. In this section, I will
show that i chooses either safe sex, or risky sex throughout his or her life, but
never both. A higher expected transmission rate  implies lower risk as long
as no unprotected encounters occur. However, when a sudden unprotected
sexual relationship occurs, a higher expected transmission rate increases the
chances of risky behavior.
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Proposition 3.1. If a safe sexual encounter is chosen at the ﬁrst period,
then safe sex will be chosen for all periods.
Proof If an individual chooses to engage in safe sex in the ﬁrst period, it is
straightforward to show that the optimization program remains the same in
the second period. Indeed, because we assume that a safe sexual encounter
has a zero expected risk of transmission, a safe encounter in t=0 has no
inﬂuence on the expected probability of dying and hence on the maximisation
program for the next period. 
Proposition 3.2. When the individual chooses to engage in risky sex with
partner j at time t = 0, protection will never be used.
Proof Proof in appendix.
Propositions (3.1) and (3.2) imply that individual i will always engage
either in safe sex or in risky sex.
Proposition 3.3. The individual chooses safe sex if:
E[Ui(sit)jsit = 0;8t]  E[Ui(sit)jsit = 1;8t]:



















14Proof Proof in appendix.
Equation (8) implies that risky sex is avoided if the expected transmission
rate , the expected serostatus of partner pj and the utility of safe sex  are
suﬃciently high. Indeed, the fear of infection and death prevents the taking
of excessive risks. This is the favorable direct eﬀect of an upward-biased
expected transmission rate. A higher life expectancy, , of HIV-positive
individuals encourages risky behavior, suggesting the pernicious eﬀect of an-
tiretroviral therapies on the level of risk taken by individuals. I will now
formally prove this statement for the expected transmission rate .
Proposition 3.4. When individuals know they are not infected, overesti-
mating the transmission rate favors safe sex.
Proof The derivative of the left-hand side of inequality (8) is zero and the
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Hence, a higher  deters risky sex because it raises the expected probability
of becoming infected and to dying. 
3.3. Decision after an unplanned risky intercourse
Within the same framework, assume that an unprotected relationship
occurs in any one time period, like an external shock. This unprotected
relationship may be due to the impulsive nature of sex or to a condom failure.
If all the parameters remain equal, the expected probability of being alive,
1 E(dt), is reduced for all future periods of time. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that risky intercourse occurs at t =  1.
If individual i would choose risky sex even without this unplanned un-
protected intercourse, the optimisation program is not aﬀected and the indi-
vidual will continue to choose risky encounters. However, if i would choose
safe sex, the optimisation program is aﬀected and i’s reaction depends on
his or her assessment of the parameters. Indeed, the satisfaction from safe
behavior decreases for two reasons. First, life expectancy is lower and hence i
15will be more prone to enjoy certain present satisfactions. Second, if he or she
survives across time, individual i learns that the unprotected encounter was
not so dangerous and may be tempted to change his or her attitude toward
risky sex. Proposition (3.1) and (3.2) have to be extended.
Proposition 3.5. When the individual i chooses to engage in risky sex at
time t, he or she will choose risky sex for all future periods of time, indepen-
dently of the amount of risk taken before t. Similarly, if i chooses protection
at time t, he or she will choose safe sex for all future periods of time, whatever
the amount of risk taken before t.
Proof Proof in appendix.
Proposition (3.5) shows that individual i will always engage either in safe
sex or in risky sex after the unplanned risky encounter.
Proposition 3.6. After the unplanned risky encounter in t =  1, the indi-
vidual chooses safe sex if:
E[Ui(sit)jsit = 0;8t > 0]  E[Ui(sit)jsit = 1;8t > 0]:








1   (1   1
)












1   [1   ]
+
pj[1   ](1   1
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Proof Proof in appendix.
The presence of  on the left-hand side of the inequality 10 constitutes
the crucial diﬀerence between inequality (8) and inequality (10). This new
term sharply modiﬁes the incentives for conducting risky sex. Indeed, a high
expected transmission rate, and a low expected life expectancy for HIV-
positive individuals raise the value of the left-hand side of the inequality 10
and increase the probability of engaging risky behavior after an unplanned
16risky encounter. Hence, an upward-biased expected transmission rate may
induce less cautious behavior when unplanned risky behavior are likely to
happen. This bias implies that a wise and careful individual may take greater
risks because he or she wrongly thinks that he or she is necessarily infected
if the partner was HIV positive. I will prove this statement formally below.
Proposition 3.7. An upward-biased expected transmission rate favors risky
sex after an unplanned risky encounter if    with:

 =
 ( + )(1   ) 
p
(1 + )( + )(1   )2
( + )2 : (11)
Proof If the derivative of the inequality (10) with respect to  is positive,
then increasing  encourages safe sex. Conversely, if this derivative is neg-
ative, increasing  encourages risky practices. The derivative of inequality
(10) with respect to  is given by:
p

1   (1    + 2)   (1   )22   [1   (1   )]2
(1   )[ + l(1   )][1   (1   )]2

:
This derivative has one positive and one negative root:
 ( + )(1   ) 
p
(1 + )( + )(1   )2
( + )2
Between these two roots, the derivative is positive, i.e. raising the expected
transmission rate  encourages safer sex. The optimal (i.e. safer) expected
transmission rate is given by the positive root  of the derivative of inequal-
ity (10) with respect to . 
4. Numerical estimation
4.1. Estimation of  for long-lasting and careless relationships
In this subsection, I will derive diﬀerent estimates of , i.e. the expected
transmission rate that maximizes condom use. I will focus on a speciﬁc
population with a high probability of unprotected encounters, where relations
between partners are long-lasting. First, I suggest some realistic values for
the parameters and I evaluate . Then, I will assess the robustness of the
estimate to changes in the parameters.
The parameters of the model are:
17 , which represents the utility gained from other sources of pleasure
than sex. I will take 10 as a benchmark value and I will check for
changes in this parameter between 0 and 1;000.
 , that is the discount factor from one period to the other. In the model,
one period of time corresponds to one sexual act. I will take 0:999 as
a benchmark value (it is the weekly discount factor corresponding to
a yearly discount factor of 0:95) and will check for changes in this
parameter between 0 and 1.
 , which represents the relative utility of safe sex compared to unpro-
tected sex. I will take 0:5 as a benchmark value and I will check for
changes in this parameter from 0 to 1.
 E(pj), which represents the expected probability that the partner is
infected. I will take 0:05 as a benchmark value and I will check for
changes in this parameter between 0 and 1.
 , that is the life expectancy of an infected person (expressed as the
remaining number of sexual encounters). Assuming two sexual encoun-
ters per week and knowing that a seropositive person has an average life
expectancy of 10 years, the benchmark value for  is 1;000. I will test
the robustness of the results for variations of  between 0 and 10:000.
 E(), that is the expected transmission rate. Because it is a probability,
it ranges between 0 and 1. I will not ﬁx a benchmark value for  because
it is the main variable of interest.
Inserting the benchmark values in equation (11) gives an optimal trans-
mission rate that prevention campaigns should disclose of  = 3:14%. The
optimal disclosed transmission rate is the expected transmission rate that
minimizes the risks taken after an unprotected encounter. The mean ex-
pected transmission rate in the Burundian sample is 81;4%. Hence, the
optimal disclosed transmission rate is much lower than the rate most people
expect. This ﬁrst result suggests that the overestimation of the transmission
rate is not optimal. The next step is to assess the robustness of the results
to parameter changes.
Firstly, ﬁgure B.7 assesses the robustess of the estimate against changes
in the discount rate , and changes in the relative utility of other pleasures
18than sex, . It appears that  is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by changes in .
On the contrary, changes in  aﬀect a lot the optimal disclosed transmission
rate.  is strictly decreasing in . Between the benchmark values for , d
ranges from  = 24:9% for  = 0:9 to  = 0:32% for  = 0:99999.
Secondly, ﬁgure B.8 assesses the robustess of the estimate of  against
changes in the discount rate , and changes in the relative utility of safe sex
.  is not aﬀected by changes in . Again,  has a big impact on the
optimal disclosed transmission rate.  is a strictly decreasing function of .
Finally, ﬁgure B.9 considers changes in  and  and has a similar interpre-
tation: the relative utility of sex compared to other pleasures and the relative
utility of safe sex compared to risky sex do not matter in the estimation of
the optimal disclosed transmission rate.
When unexpected risky encounters are likely, I conclude that the optimal
disclosed transmission rate ranges between 3% and 24.9%. An upward-biased
expected transmission rate, as in the sample of Burundian students, is then
probably dangerous. The estimation of the optimal disclosed transmission
rate is very sensitive to slight changes in the discount rate , especially be-
tween  = 0:9 and  = 1. A discount rate per sexual relationship (i.e. a for
few days) of 0:9 seems very low, but sexuality may be prone to instinctive
or short-termist behavior, justifying the“small” discount rate chosen the up-
per bound of the range. More empirical research on sexuality and implicit
discount rates is needed to strengthen the estimate.
4.2. Estimation of  for diﬀerent sexuality proﬁles
Not all relationships are as long-lasting as suggested in the last subsec-
tion. Some sexual encounters are one-oﬀ events, some are repeated a few
times, and others are long-lasting. For any individual aiming to have only
one-oﬀ sexual encounters, the analysis after an unplanned encounter is of
course not meaningful. This may be the case in speciﬁc sexual networks.
On the contrary, in long-lasting relationships, especially when condoms are
not easily available or not always used properly, numerous sexual encoun-
ters can occur after an unprotected encounter, endorsing the simulation of
the optimal disclosed transmission rate. Of course, it would be very diﬃcult
to reveal separately diﬀerent transmission rates to subpopulations that have
diﬀerent sexuality proﬁles. Hence, it is crucial to assess globally the relative
importance of casual and regular encounters.
19With the data from the survey among students in Burundi, I studied the
distribution of the length of relationships and the number of sexual encoun-
ters. Focusing on the lastest sexual partner, less than 0.8% of the sexual
encounters were with a casual partner, 0.4% were a single encounter within
a long-lasting relationship, and 7.9% were in a relationship where sex is not
common (less than one encounter per month). By contrast, 90.7% of sexual
acts took place within long-lasting relationships where sex was regular (one
or more relation per month). 34% of the interviewees admited irregular con-
dom use, and 24.6% had already experienced a condom failure. Thus, a large
proportion of sexual encounters occured in long-lasting relationships where
condom use was not ensured. These stylized facts justify the pertinence of
the model and the simulations, at least among educated Burundian students.
However, casual encounters and relationships where condoms are perfectly
used are not marginal. The next step is then to ﬁnd an optimal disclosed
transmission rate  lying between the optimal  for casual encounters and
for relationships where a condom is used perfectly (i.e.  = 1), and the
optimal  for long-lasting relationships where condoms are not perfectly used
(i.e.  = ). Let us simulate inequality (8) that determine condom use
before any unplanned risky intercourse. The aim is to assess the impact of
 on the risk taken during casual encounters.
Figures B.10 to B.14 are simulations of the inequality (8). The vertical
axis measures the utility of risky sex divided by the utility of safe sex. Hence,
when the outcome is greater than one, individual i chooses risky sex. Oth-
erwise, i chooses to use condoms. The ﬁgures show that  has no inﬂuence
on the decision to use condoms, except for very small values of  ( < 0:05).
A higher expected prevalence E(pj) implies safer behavior because people
want to avoid a dangerous disease (Figure B.10). Other pleasures than sex,
, also imply more cautious behavior (Figure B.11). A high discount rate
implies condom use because future periods are as important as the present
(Figure B.12). If safe sex gives as much pleasure as risky sex, people will
choose to protect themselves (Figure B.13). Finally, if the life expectancy
of infected people is very long, people do not fear being sick and engage in
risky behavior (Figure B.14).
I conclude that the expected transmission rate E() has almost no impact
on the decision to use condoms for 0:05 < E() < 1. For E() < 0:05, that
20is if people think that the transmission rate is very low, the utility of risky
sex increases sharply. Hence, disclosing too low a transmission rate during
prevention campaigns may therefore be dangerous for people engaging in
casual sex. Above 5%, the risk of becoming infected is suﬃcient to prevent
all dangerous behavior. I conclude that the optimal disclosed transmission
rate lies between 5 and 24.9%. More research on the implicit discount rate
during sexual encounters is needed in order to narrow this estimate.
5. Discussion
5.1. Implementation and external validity
The model and simulations disscussed here conﬁrm the idea of a U-shaped
relation between risk perception and condom use. If unexpected encounters
without condoms are quite common, the calibrations of the model suggest
that it would be optimal to tell the population that the transmission rate
ranges between 3 and 24.9%. This range is too large in populations where
some sexual encounters occur in one-night stands. Indeed, an expected trans-
mission rate below 5% encourages risky behavior because of the marginal of
being infected. In a general population with diﬀerent sexuality proﬁles, the
optimal disclosed transmission rate ranges between 5 and 24.9%
It is morally diﬃcult to promote prevention campaigns which lie to people
by advertising a transmission rate of 5, 10 or 20%. Moreover, the sustainabil-
ity of such policies is questionnable because well-informed people would re-
act against the misleading campaign. Some alternatives are however morally
more defensible. First, it would be possible to disclose the per-relationship
transmission rate which is about 20% (Kaplan, 1990). Another possibility
would be to announce an upper bound for the transmission rate. By saying
that the infectivity is never higher than 20% and by insisting on the fact that
protection is crucial even if an unprotected encounter has occurred, people
may be encouraged to engage in safer behavior. Otherwise, it is possible to
reveal imprecise information, insisting on the importance of condom use after
an unplanned risky encounter because the virus is not always transmitted.
Finally, it would be possible to disclose the true transmission rate of the
virus. Given these imperfect strategies, empirical testing of the model and
of those proposals is essential before engaging in any prevention campaign
aiming to disclose the transmission rate.
215.2. Empirical test
Random experiments are probably the least criticized and most promising
tool to evaluate development programs. However, they often raise ethical
concerns because some people are randomly assigned to a program that has
unknown consequences. Conversely, the control group is deliberately removed
from a potentially beneﬁcial treatment. For this topic (i.e. the disclosure of
an optimal transmission rate), random experiments also raise ethical concerns
because it is not known how people will react to the information. It would
be morally untenable to engage some people in a prevention campaign that
may be harmful for them.
In order to test the model, it is therefore necessary to ﬁnd two very similar
groups of people who diﬀer only in the fact that they have diﬀerent percep-
tion of the transmission rate. Random samples of the population do not ﬁt
this characterization because nearly all individuals expect the transmission
rate to be very high. Hence, no comparison group is available. However, a
ﬁeld experiment among students of health might be feasible. By compar-
ing the behavior of students who had already followed a course disclosing
the true transmission rate with that of other students, it should be possible
to measure the impact of the disclosure of the transmission rate on behav-
ior. Nevertheless, although this identiﬁcation strategy seems unbiased, its
external validity is questionable.
5.3. Possible extensions
This simple model is a ﬁrst step in the understanding of the diﬀerent be-
havioral consequences of the disclosure of the rate of HIV/AIDS infectivity.
This paper may be extended in many directions to achieve a more realis-
tic model and more precise estimates of the optimal disclosed transmission
rate. In this section, I will discuss some possible extensions that are be-
yond the scope of this paper. First, a more complex model could include all
other factors that may inﬂuence condom use. For instance, the possibility
of HIV/AIDS testing, the bargaining power of the two individuals, the con-
traception decision and the desire to procreate, all partly explain condom
use. As long as seropositivity is a private information, the conclusions of
this model are valid because unprotected sex remains risky. For people using
condoms as a contraceptive, the expected transmission rate has no inﬂuence
on their decision to protect themselves. This model is not meaningful for
them, but its conclusions hold for other people. The bargaining power of
22partners probably has no inﬂuence on the results if women and men have
similar expectations about HIV infectivity.
Secondly, in this simple speciﬁcation, the only cause of death is the
AIDS virus, and HIV does not enter directly into the utility function, except
through the probability of death. In addition, antiretroviral therapies (ARV)
are not considered and it is assumed that condoms are perfectly safe. More
complex speciﬁcations of the risk should not signiﬁcantly alter the positive
and the negative eﬀects of a biased expected transmission rate. For instance,
the availability of ARV would raise the life expectancy while infected. As
shown in the simulation, it has no impact on the optimal disclosed transmis-
sion rate. Also, adding HIV disutility or condom failure would modify the
utility of safe and risky sex, but would not remove the pernicious eﬀect of an
over-estimated transmission rate.
Finally, allowing for multiple partners would be realistic. In this model,
changing partner is never optimal for i if the pleasure of sex remains un-
changed throughout the relationship and if E(pj) is equal among all possible
partners. The optimality of partner change would require either diminishing
the pleasure of sex during the relationship, the existence of safer partners, or
the inclusion of other factors than sex in the utility function. The conclusions
should not be aﬀected by such modiﬁcations.
6. Conclusion
The estimation of the infectivity of the HIV/AIDS virus is generally up-
wardly biased. In this paper, a behavioral model was constructed in order to
assess the positive and negative impacts of such biased knowledge. On the
one hand, a high expected transmission rate implies safer behavior because
people want to protect themselves against a disease that is seen as very in-
fectious. On the other hand, individuals expecting a very high transmission
rate may cease to protect themselves after an unprotected encounter because
they think that they will have already been infected if the partner was HIV
positive. Simulations indicate that the optimal transmission rate to disclose
during prevention campaigns lies between 5% and 24.9%.
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25Appendix A. Proofs
Proposition 3.2. When the individual chooses to engage in risky sex
with partner j at time t = 0, then protection will never be used.
Proof Because of the last proposition, we know that an individual who
chooses unprotected sex at least once will not use protection in the ﬁrst
period. Indeed, from proposition (3.1), we know that if i chooses to use
protection in the ﬁrst period, then he or she will always opt for protected
encounters. Hence, we have to prove that the choice sil 1 = 1 implies the
choice sil = 1 8l > 1.
Assuming i is alive at time t = l   1, sil 1 = 1 is optimal if 8sil;sil+1;::::
U
sil 1
jdil 1=0 = U(1;:::;1;sil;:::)jdil 1=0   U(1;:::;0;sil;:::)jdil 1=0 > 0:(A.1)
The fact that i had unprotected encounters and is still alive at t = l   1
gives him or her information about the true parameters. Assuming rational
behavior, he or she will correct the optimization program, knowing him- or
herself to be in one of the three states described by the equations (3) to
(5) (or alternatively, knowing him- or herself not to be in the fourth state
described by equation (6) i.e. not dead). Hence, if i is alive at t = l   1 and
had unprotected sexual relationships in the past, the probabilities of being
in each of the 3 possible states are:
E(pil 1 = 0 and pj = 0) = ml 1(1   pj); (A.2)
E(pil 1 = 0 and pj = 1) = ml 1pj(1   )
l 1; (A.3)









with m > 1 ﬁxed such that the sum of the probabilities of these three
states is equal to one:
ml 1 =
1
1   pj[1   (1   1
)l 1  
Pl 2
k=1(1   1   1
)l k 1(1   )k]
: (A.5)
26This factor ml 1 may be seen has a correction for “trust”. The fact that i is
still alive indicates that the unprotected encounters are safer than expected.
We have dmt
dt > 0 because the probability of being dead because of having
unprotected sexual relationships rises over time.
The probability of dying at time t > l 1, knowing that i is alive at time
l   1 is given by:
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:
The ﬁrst term of the subtraction represents the utility gain from the unpro-
tected relationship at time t = l   1 while the second term accounts for the
utility loss due to a higher probability of dying in the future. If U
sil 1jdil 1=0
is positive, i chooses to engage in unprotected sex.
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 P(dying due to risk taken in l)

:
To complete the proof of proposition (3.2), we need to show that if risky
sex is preferred at time t = l   1 (equation (A.9) greater than 0), then risky
sex is also preferred at time t = l (equation (A.10) is also greater than 0).
This is, of course, the case: the opportunity cost of an unprotected sexual
encounter is lower in the future because remaining life is shorter. Formally,
after dividing equation (A.10) by , we have to compare the factor ml 1 that
enters negatively into equation (A.9) and the factor ml(1   ) that enters
negatively into equation (A.10). This completes the proof because:
ml 1 > ml(1   ): (A.11)

Proposition 3.3. The individual chooses safe sex if:
E[Ui(sit)jsit = 0;8t]  E[Ui(sit)jsit = 1;8t]:



















Proof Because the probability of dying for i is zero if protection is always
used, the total utility of i’s inﬁnite life is:








29Conversely, if individual i only practices risky sex, his or her expected total
utility is:
























This inﬁnite sum can be decomposed for each period of time:
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Equation (A.14) can be rewritten by grouping in one inﬁnite sum the ﬁrst
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Proposition 3.5. When the individual i chooses to engage in risky
sex at time t, he or she will choose risky sex for all future periods of time,
independently of the amount of risk taken before t. Similarly, if i chooses
protection at time t, he or she will choose safe sex for all future periods of
time, whatever the amount of risk taken before t.
Proof Following the same lines as the proof of proposition 3.2, let us assume
that risky sex is optimal until time t = l   1; we will show that it implies
that risky sex is optimal at time t = l. The same applies to safe sex. The
exponents are slightly diﬀerent from those for proposition 3.2 because we
now assume that an unprotected encounter occurs at time t =  1.
Equation (A.7) shows that the utility of i when taking a decision at time
t = l   1 is equal to:
U(:::sil 1;:::)jdil 1=0 = past utility + 
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P(dying due to infection in l)   P(dying due to risk taken after l)

:
Let us analyze in detail the term on the second line of these equations for
each kind of past behavior. This term is positive and represents the change
in the probability of dying in the future given today’s behavior.
Let us begin with the proof of the ﬁrst statement of proposition (3.5). If
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:
Assuming that individual i prefers risky sex at time t = l   1, we know
that this term will be lower when i has to take the decision at time t = l.
The probability of not being infected will be lower. Formally, it is clear that
mlpj[1 ]l is decreasing with l. Because this term aﬀects negatively equation
(A.20), we conclude that risky sex will be chosen for all future periods of time
if risky sex is chosen once.
Similarly, we prove the second statement of proposition (3.5). If safe sex
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l 1 is increasing with time, we see that this coeﬃcient will
be higher from one period to the next. Again, because this term enters
negatively into equation (A.20), we conclude that safe sex will be chosen for
all future periods of time if safe sex is chosen once. 
Proposition 10. After the unplanned risky encounter in t =  1, the
individual chooses safe sex if:
E[Ui(sit)jsit = 0;8t > 0]  E[Ui(sit)jsit = 1;8t > 0]:
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Proof The proof is similar to that of proposition (3.3), but with a higher
probability of dying because of the unprotected encounter at time t =  1.
33The expected total utility of safe sex is given by:
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The expected total utility of risky sex is given by:
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We develop the double inﬁnite sum for each period of time:
t = 0 ) 
00; (A.28)
















































34We then compute the inﬁnite sums by grouping diagonal terms. By using
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: (A.29)
Introducing this into equation (A.27) and simplifying, we ﬁnally have:
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Figure B.1: Expected transmission rate without condom
35Figure B.2: Expected transmission rate with condom
Figure B.3: Expected prevalence in Burundi
36Figure B.4: Life expectancy of HIV-positive individuals
Figure B.5: Life expectancy of HIV-positive individuals with ARV treatment
37Figure B.6: Pleasure with condom
Figure B.7: The optimal disclosed transmission rate  as a function of  and 
38Figure B.8: The optimal disclosed transmission rate  as a function of  and 
Figure B.9: The optimal disclosed transmission rate  as a function of  and 
39Figure B.10: Inﬂuence of E() and E(pj) on condom use.
Figure B.11: Inﬂuence of E() and  on condom use.
40Figure B.12: Inﬂuence of E() and  on condom use.
Figure B.13: Inﬂuence of E() and  on condom use.
41Figure B.14: Inﬂuence of E() and E() on condom use.
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